
Part 1
Forty years is not distance
Forty years is a long time.
It is long enough for careers to begin and end. Long enough for technologies to become obsolete, then rediscovered. Long enough for institutions to convince themselves that what once failed could not fail again in quite the same way.
And yet, forty years is not distance.
The facts of the Challenger Accident have not changed. The technical data is the same. The timelines are the same. The warnings are still there, written plainly in memos and transcripts. What has changed is not our understanding of what happened, but our relationship to it.
Time does not soften truth. It tests whether we are still willing to look at it directly.
One of the quiet dangers of anniversaries is that they can feel like closure. A marker passed. A chapter finished. But Challenger was never meant to be a story with an ending. It was a lesson handed forward, one generation at a time, with the expectation that it would be carried, examined, and applied.
Distance would imply safety. It would imply that the conditions that allowed that launch to proceed no longer exist. That the pressures of schedule, reputation, hierarchy, and optimism have somehow been engineered out of complex systems.
They have not.
What time does offer is clarity, if we choose to use it. It strips away the noise of the moment and leaves only what mattered. Not the hardware alone, but the decisions. Not the weather alone, but the willingness to proceed anyway. Not the absence of data, but the presence of doubt and how it was treated.
Forty years later, the most uncomfortable realization may be this: the failure was not exotic. It was familiar. It was human. And that familiarity is precisely why it still matters.
Remembering Challenger is not about reliving grief. It is about refusing the false comfort that comes with saying, “that was then”.
Because “then” is never as far away as we would like to believe.

Collectively, we have forgotten.
We have forgotten the horror, the pain, and the sadness that come with losing human lives because of operational decisions. Schedule, budget, reputation – usually not in that order.
There are plenty of examples where an organization knows the best way to proceed, based on DECADES of experience. Unfortunately, someone with a spreadsheet will eventually convince leadership to outsource testing, or disregard minor manufacturing defects, or silence engineering concerns.
Recent examples are easy to find. Boeing & SigSauer come to mind. We have better tools for design and engineering than at any other time in history, and instead of increasing safety, the tools are leveraged for ‘value engineering,’ where the purpose is to shave costs above all other priorities. Schedules become immoveable, based on iron-clad contracts, and compromises rein.
I appreciate you endeavoring this series, Roger. I look forward to future entries.